

MC/DC Software Testing



Some Context & Definitions

What is a unit? This whole thing is a “unit”

Is this unit safety-critical? Yes

When should units be tested?

What is a decision?

Early in development, as fit **This is a Decision**

What is a “unit testing” phase? **These are Conditions**

- This is when MC/DC is done


How are they tested?

- Run each unit with differing input-> verify result
- MC/DC: Exercise all meaningful paths for “coverage”

Four MC/DC Rules

Why? To make sure it works right and all paths are covered

1. Each entry and exit point is invoked (lines 1 and 10 are tested)
2. Each decision takes every possible outcome (lines 7 and 9 are tested, abort (true) or don't abort (false))
3. Each condition in a decision takes every possible outcome
 - Conditions need to be tested for both TRUE and FALSE
4. Each condition in a decision is shown to **independently affect the outcome**
 - Why? This tests each condition **only when it matters** – when it effects outcome
 - Two primary types of MCDC¹ -- may choose either of these, or a combination of both
 - Unique-Cause
 - Masking



```
1 boolean function check_abort(boolean off_course,
                             boolean abort_commanded,
                             boolean valid_abort_command)
2 {
3     boolean result = false; // true if aborting;
4     if (off_course OR
5         (abort_commanded AND valid_abort_command))
6     then
7         result = true; // initiate abort sequence
8     else
9         result = false; // don't abort, keep flying
10    return result;
11 }
```

Sample Code

Examples follow



“Unique Cause” MC/DC Example

Truth Table

Test Case	Conditions (Input Variables)			Result of Decision (abort=1 not=0)
	Off-course	Abort Cmd	Valid Cmd	
1	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	1	0
3	0	1	0	0
4	0	1	1	1
5	1	0	0	1
6	1	0	1	1
7	1	1	0	1
8	1	1	1	1

4 Green Test Cases for MC/DC

All 8 Test Cases for MC/DC

```

1 boolean function check_abort(boolean off_course,
                             boolean abort_commanded,
                             boolean valid_abort_command)
...
4   if (off_course OR
5       (abort_commanded AND valid_abort_command))
...

```

Sample Code

Call the function 4 times with these values: Unit Test Code

```

r = check_abort(1,0,1); // test case 6, r = abort
r = check_abort(0,0,1); // test case 2, r = no abort
r = check_abort(0,1,1); // test case 4, r = abort
r = check_abort(0,1,0); // test case 3, r = no abort

```

- “Unique Cause” MCDC

- Only one condition in a decision is changed at a time, *holding all others constant*, while verifying change in result

- Example:

- The function “check_abort” needs to be run with **pairs of test cases (6,2,4,3), in that order**

- Start with Cases 6 and 2, changing only “off_course” yields a different result, verifying independence of “off course”
- Next use test 2 and 4, changing only “abort” yields a different result, verifying “abort”
- Last, run cases 4 and 3, which only changes “valid” for a different result

- N+1 tests are needed (N is the number of conditions in the decision), vs. 2^N for all permutations

- This is the *minimum set of meaningful test cases*



“Masking” MC/DC Example

Truth Table

Test Case	Conditions (Input Variables)			Result of Decision (abort=1 not=0)
	Off-course	Abort Cmd	Valid Cmd	
1	0	0	X	0
2	0	0	X	0
3	0	1	0	0
4	0	1	1	1
5	1	X	X	1
6	1	X	X	1
7	1	X	X	1
8	1	X	X	1

X's are “don't care” values since left-to-right evaluation is stopped

```

1 boolean function check_abort(boolean off_course,
                             boolean abort_commanded,
                             boolean valid_abort_command)
...
4   if (off_course OR
5       (abort_commanded AND valid_abort_command))

```

Sample Code

```

Call the function 4 times with these values: Unit Test Code
r = check_abort(0,1,0); // test case 3, r = no_abort
r = check_abort(0,1,1); // test case 4, r = abort
r = check_abort(0,0,X); // cases 1 or 2, r = no_abort
r = check_abort(1,X,X); // cases 5,6,7,or 8, r=abort

```

- “Masking” MCDC – relies on computer “short circuiting” – evaluation stopping as soon as a decision can be made
 - The condition under test changes, **but others can change** as long as they will be “short circuited” (marked “don't care” in table)
 - Any tests including both (3 and 4), either (1 or 2), or any one of (5,6,7,8) meet the criteria
 - (3,4,1,5), (3,4,2,5), (3,4,1,6), (3,4,2,6), (3,4,1,7), (3,4,2,7), (3,4,1,8), (3,4,2,8)
- Example:
 - Start with cases 3 and 4 which both must be run since there are no short circuits to verify “valid command”
 - Next run either (1 or 2) and 4 since the result changes in both of those cases, to verify “abort cmd”
 - Last, run one case from (5,6,7,8) which changes “valid” for a different result
- This will require $2 \cdot \sqrt{N}$ tests, less than in the “unique cause” form of MC/DC



- Further Reading & References:

- ¹ John J. Chilenski. “An Investigation of Three Forms of the Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MCDC) Criterion. Technical Report”, DOT/FAA/AR-01/18, US. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, April 2001.
- Standards requiring MC/DC testing for Safety-Critical code:
 - Aircraft - DO-178B (Safety-critical Level A or B)
 - Automotive - ISO-26262 (ASIL D)
 - Nuclear - IEC-61508-3 (SIL 1-3)
 - Spacecraft - NASA NPR-7150.2 (Class A Safety-critical)

- Provide comments to where you’ve seen this or to lorraine.e.prokop@nasa.gov

- Related follow-on “software shorts”
 - “Using gcov for MC/DC Testing”

Backup for MCDC

MC/DC Software Testing One-Pager



MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) Rules:

- Each entry and exit point is invoked (lines 1 and 9 are tested)
- Each decision takes every possible outcome (lines 6 and 8 are tested, abort and null)
- Each condition in a decision takes every possible outcome (off_course, abort, and valid are each tested for both TRUE and FALSE)
- Each condition in a decision is shown to **independently affect the outcome** - Why? This tests each condition **only when it matters** – when it effects outcome
 - Three (3) types of MCDC¹ -- Unique-Cause (N+1 tests), Masking (2* \sqrt{n}) tests), and Unique-Cause+Masking (NPR7150.2 does not dictate which to use)
 - “**Unique Cause**” MCDC holds all variables constant and changes only one at a time testing for unique outcome
 - Example: Only rows 6,2,4,3 in table need be tested (*in that order*) and represent **one possible minimum set of meaningful test cases** (i.e Starting with row 6, changing only “off_course” in Test 2 results in a different outcome, then test 4 changes only “abort” with a different outcome, then test #3 changes “valid” for a different outcome)
 - “**Masking**” MCDC allows other conditions to change as long as only the condition of interest influences the outcome (See backup for performance)
 - Masking MCDC is implemented by “short-circuiting” in computer programs (i.e. stopping as soon as test criteria are met)
 - Example: Any 4 tests including one of (5,6,7,8), both (3 and 4), and either (1 or 2) meet the criteria. (i.e. (5,1,3,4), (6,2,3,4), (8,1,3,4), etc...)

```

1 function check_abort()           Sample Code
2 {
3     if (off_course OR
4         abort_commanded AND valid_abort_command)
5     then
6         abort(); // initiate abort sequence
7     else
8         null; // do nothing
9     return;
10 }
```

Test Case	Off-course	Abort Cmd	Valid Cmd	Outcome
1	0	0	0 X	0
2	0	0	1 X	0
3	0	1	0	0
4	0	1	1	1
5	1	0 X	0 X	1
6	1	0 X	1 X	1
7	1	1 X	0 X	1
8	1	1 X	1 X	1

Possible Test Cases:

- 8 Cases for full Condition Combination Coverage (CCC)
- 4 Green Row Cases (6,4,2,3 in that order) for “unique cause” MC/DC
- X’s indicate “don’t care” for “masking” MC/DC

- Standards requiring MC/DC testing for Safety-Critical code
 - Aircraft - DO-178B (Safety-critical Level A or B)
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 - Nuclear - IEC-61508-3 (SIL 1-3)
 - Spacecraft - NASA NPR-7150.2 (Class A Safety-critical)

¹ AJohn J. Chilenski. “An Investigation of Three Forms of the Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MCDC) Criterion. Technical Report”, DOT/FAA/AR-01/18, April 2001.

MC/DC Software Training



Introduction Notes:

- *Who I am*
- *First in a series of software shorts on topics in software*
- *What is MC/DC? Modified Decision/Coverage testing – sounds sorta “questionable”*
 - *Way of testing the minimum set of all meaningful logic paths through the code*
 - *Not all logical paths through the code, but only the paths that effect the outcome*
- *Why do it?*
 - *Aside from it being required for safety critical code in space and aircraft, automotive, nuclear industries – it just makes sense!*
 - *Not to kill someone*

How to do it?

- *I will go over -*
 - *What is a unit*
 - *What are the rules of MC/DC*
 - *Provide simple examples of both forms of MC/DC*
 - *And a warning – I will show some short code – do not fear! I will step through it!*



- Hope this was helpful
- Provide comments to where you've seen this or to lorraine.e.prokop@nasa.gov
- Related follow-on “software shorts”
 - “ “Using gcov for MC/DC Testing”
- Have a nice day!




“Using gcov for MC/DC” One-Pager

- GCOV - Open-source tool used with gnu c compiler (gcc) to perform unit test code coverage analysis
 - Performs Object Branch Coverage (OBC) through generation of Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) – see example
 - Object Branch Coverage had been **proven¹ to be equivalent to MCDC if OBC contains all “tree-like” decisions**
 - Does **not** identify *all* permutations to achieve Condition Combination Coverage (CCC) (which is a good thing, limiting tests to only those meaningful)
- Can gcov be used to meet MCDC criteria?
 - **Yes, but** some extra work must be done to ensure all decisions are “tree-like” (i.e. no graphs) – see example
 - All non-tree-like decisions can be converted to tree-like decisions¹
 - Non tree-like decisions have been shown to be a VERY small percentage of overall decisions in several large code bases (<1%⁴, “few”²)
 - gcov performs “unique-cause+short-circuit” MC/DC, “short-circuit” being the implementation-equivalent to the “masking” form of MC/DC
 - **The “taken at least once” statistic must be driven to 100% to achieve MC/DC coverage against all tree-like decisions**
 - Open source tools are available to identify non-tree-like decisions
 - <https://www.open-do.org/projects/couverture/>, <https://gitlab.com/gtd-gmbh/mcdc-checker/mcdc-checker>

Sample BDD's

Tree-like

A or (B and C)



- 6 branches/edges
- 4 tests needed to cover 4 leaves


GOV results running 3 tests: #3-010, 4=011 6=101; ABC)

Taken at least once: 83.33% of 6

rewrite

Non-Tree-like

(B and C) or A



- 6 branches/edges
- **3 tests needed to cover 3 leaves**

Taken at least once: 100.00% of 6

Guidelines

- Must **turn off all optimization**; run gcc with the following switches
 - `gcc -O0 -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage`
- Run “gcov -b” on output and **drive “taken at least once” to 100%**
- **Periodically or in CI**
 - Run tool to **identify non-tree-like branches**
 - **Rewrite all non-tree-like to be tree-like**
 - Write additional unit tests to achieve 100% “taken at least once”


References:

- ¹Comar, Guitton, Hainque, and Quinot. “Formalization and Comparison of MCDC and Object Branch Coverage”, Embedded Real Time Software and Systems Conference, Feb 2012.
- ²Thomas Wucher, Andoni Arregui. “MC/DC for Space: A new Approach to Ensure MC/DC Structural Coverage with Exclusively Open Source Tools”, ESA Software Product Assurance Workshop 2021.
- ³AJohn J. Chilenski. “An Investigation of Three Forms of the Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MCDC) Criterion. Technical Report”, DOT/FAA/AR-01/18, US. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, April 2001.
- ⁴Bordin, et.al. “Object and Source Coverage for Critical Applications with the COUVERTURE Open Analysis Framework”, Embedded Real Time Software and Systems Conference, May 2010.


Backup



Effectiveness of Masking vs. Unique-cause MCDC



Effectiveness of MCDC types vs. other coverages



Reference: AJohn J. Chilenski. "An Investigation of Three Forms of the Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MCDC) Criterion. Technical Report", DOT/FAA/AR-01/18, US. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, April 2001.